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The  role  of  teachers  in  achieving  good  quality  education  is  universally 
acknowledged. What is less clear is what incentives are required to attract good 
teachers to teaching. Incentives, including teachers pay, need to be sufficient yet, 
in the light of fiscal resource constraints, not excessive.   
 
This  paper  deals  with  the  issue  of  teacher  pay  in  South  Africa  before  the 
introduction of the recent Occupation Specific Dispensation (OSD) for teachers, 
that was intended to offer more attractive lifetime incentives to teachers in order 
to attract quality teachers. The paper first reviews the literature on teacher pay 
internationally and for South Africa, before using recent South African household 
surveys to empirically compare the wage received by teachers to that received by 
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1  This  paper  was  originally  written  as  background  research  for  a  World  Bank  study  on 
accountability in public services in South Africa. The authors would like to acknowledge the 
research  assistance  provided  by  Paula  Armstrong  and  comments  by  Deon  Filmer.  The 
viewpoints expressed are our own.   3 
1. INTRODUCTION: TEACHERS AND EDUCATIONAL QUALITY 
It is widely recognized that teachers play a central role in determining the quality of 
education received by students (UNESCO, 2006: 1). Teachers are indeed understood to 
be  the  “central  actors  in  education,  facilitators  of  learning,  bringers  of  knowledge, 
brokers of relationships between pupils and the societies in which they live” (Voluntary 
Services Overseas [VSO], 2002: 4). Within developing societies specifically, teachers 
are often seen as the major learning resource because in these societies working and 
living conditions are difficult, teaching resources are scarce and teachers are considered 
the only way in which society is able to achieve its educational aspirations. “Teachers’ 
interaction with learners is the axis on which educational quality turns” (VSO, 2002: 10).  
 
Teachers are indeed considered the key enabling factor in improving educational quality 
(UNESCO, 2005: 160). But in developing countries, however, there is a great temptation 
to  lower  the  minimum  requirements  that  teachers  must  meet  in  order  to  join  the 
profession, so as to deal with the rapid expansion of access to education which requires 
substantially  more  teachers.  This  is  often  achieved  by  allowing  people  with  lower 
academic qualifications to enter teacher training and ultimately become teachers, thus 
potentially lowering the quality of education (UNESCO, 2005: 160). Teacher quality itself 
depends  on  a  number  of  factors,  including  the  individuals  attracted  to  the  teaching 
profession,  what  incentive  these  individuals  have  to  perform  well  as  teachers,  and 
whether high ability teachers remain in the teaching profession (Harnani-Limarino, 2005: 
63). 
 
Hernani-Limarino  (2005:  65)  relates  the  recruitment,  performance  and  retention  of 
teachers directly to the “opportunity cost” of being a teacher, the most important of which 
is the wage that an individual who chooses teaching as a profession could earn in other 
professions.  Additional  factors  influencing  the  opportunity  cost  of  teaching  are  those 
affecting the kind of people who become teachers, the performance incentives that those 
attracted to the profession face, as well as the likelihood that high-ability teachers will in 
fact  remain  in  the  system  (Hernani-Limarino,  2005:  65). Indeed  a  prominent  area of 
contention within the economics of education literature is whether the pay offered to 
teachers  is  sufficient  to  ensure  an  acceptable  quality  of  teaching  within  schools  by 
attracting,  recruiting  and  retaining  an  adequate  number  of  “acceptable”  teachers 
(Podgursky, 2005: 1). The argument is cantered on the idea that education departments   4 
lack the required resources to provide adequate professional development or to pay 
competitive salaries to teachers.  
 
It is therefore clear that firstly, teachers play a pivotal role in the quality of education 
received  by  students,  and  secondly,  that  the  wages  received  by  teachers  play  a 
considerable role in determining the quality of teachers who enter the teaching force.   
 
This discussion indicates  that it is important  to investigate  which  individuals become 
teachers. It is therefore necessary to compare the wage received by teachers to that 
received  by  non-teachers  with  a  similar  level  of  education.  This  report  will  start  by 
reviewing the literature on teacher pay internationally (section 2) and for South Africa 
(section  3),  before  using  the  recent  South  African  household  surveys  to  empirically 
assess the relative earnings of teachers in section 4.  
 
 
2. RELATIVE TEACHER PAY 
Relative teacher pay is a measure of how the pay received by teachers compares to the 
pay received by non-teachers with comparable levels of education. Investigating relative 
teacher  pay  therefore  involves  estimating  the  wage  that  individuals  who  enter  the 
teaching profession would receive in alternative occupations (Hernani-Limarino, 2005: 
68),  allowing  one  to  take  a  view  on  whether  teachers  are  well-paid  relative  to  non-
teachers.  
 
From an economic point of view, what matters in terms of relative teacher pay is the 
degree  of  substitutability  between  professions  (Podgursky,  2005:  3). The  question  is 
therefore whether the remuneration schemes associated with the teaching profession 
and  non-teaching  professions  would  induce  teachers  to  switch  from  the  teaching 
profession to other professions. One might extend the investigation further and look at 
how much relative pay structures would have to change to retain teachers, or for non-
teachers  to  enter  the  teaching  profession.  Presumably  individuals  who  are  the  most 
talented in their fields receive higher wages since employers are prepared to offer higher 
wages to more productive employees (assuming that the most talented workers are also 
the  most  productive  workers)  and  may  compete  with  each  other  to  attract  the  best 
workers. Because of this, wages offered to talented workers increase in all sectors.    5 
 
Relative teacher pay may be investigated in a number of ways. One of these is to look at 
the pay of teachers relative to that of similar individuals who have not chosen teaching 
as a profession. If the pay received by teachers is substantially below that received by 
workers in other professions with roughly the same level of educational attainment, there 
exists at least prima facie evidence that teacher pay is inadequate (Podgursky, 2005: 1).  
 
Important to note is that although pay is the most important part of the labour contract, it 
is  not  the  only  component  of  the  contract  that  determines  firstly  whether  or  not 
individuals join the teaching force, and secondly the quality and performance of those 
who do join the teaching force. Examples of other factors affecting teacher recruitment 
and performance are job stability, flexibility of work schedules, number of hours required 
at  work,  in-kind  payments  or  vacations  (Hernani-Limarino,  2005:  65-66)  i.e.  non-
monetary factors. Indeed the size of a teacher’s relative wage depends largely on these 
factors and so a more complete measurement of the opportunity cost of being a teacher 
requires  more  information  on  these  non-monetary  dimensions  of  teacher  contracts 
(Hernani-Limarino, 2005: 66-67). However, a broader definition of opportunity costs may 
complicate  the  analysis  as  the  wage  gap  between  teachers  and  non-teachers  is 
attributable on the one hand to differences in remuneration, and on the other hand to 
differences in labour supply (Hernani-Limarino, 2005: 67).  
 
2.1 Differences in hours worked 
A possible complication involved in comparing the wages of teachers to those in other 
professions is that there are significant differences in the number of hours worked for 
teachers  and  for  non-teachers.  Although  hours  worked  can  be  controlled  for  by 
measuring  hourly  wages,  it  must  be  acknowledged  that  this  feature  of  the  teaching 
profession may have a significant separate impact on who is attracted to the teaching 
profession  (Podgursky,  2005:  12).  The  fact  that  teachers  do  not  work  during  school 
holidays and that (in most cases) the school day (and therefore the hours that teachers 
are required to be at work) is shorter than the time that non-teachers are required to be 
at work means that teachers effectively work fewer hours than non-teachers (Podgursky, 
2005:  12).  The  teaching  profession  would  therefore  appeal  more  to  individuals  who 
value long vacations and short and more predictable working hours (for example women 
who have or who plan to have children). Conversely, the fact that as a teacher fewer   6 
hours are “available” for work implies that even if teachers earned an hourly wage above 
that  of  non-teachers  they  may  receive  overall  lower  pay  than  non-teachers  –  a 
considerable disincentive to join the teaching profession (Podgursky, 2005: 12). 
 
The hours involved in teaching may therefore have a considerable impact on who joins 
the teaching profession. Although not completely independent from the issue of teacher 
pay (since the hours that teachers work may restrict them form earning overall higher 
wages),  it  may  have  a  separate  and  different  effect  in  terms  of  determining  which 
individuals become teachers. 
 
The focus of this paper is whether the pay of South African teachers is “adequate”. In 
other words, does the remuneration scheme according to which South African teachers 
are paid result in the highest level of educational quality possible? The following sections 
look at this in greater detail. 
 
3. THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Background 
  The late apartheid period saw a rapid extension of public provision of education to black 
South Africans, resulting in high and rising school enrolment rates Thus when the ANC 
came to power in 1994, they inherited policies that required extremely high levels of 
public expenditure (with over 6% of GDP and more than 20% of the budget being spent 
on education).  
 
Between 1993 and 1997, there was a considerable “swing” in the allocation of resources 
to poor (predominantly black) households. School education has proved to be an area in 
which social spending is particularly well-targeted, with further reallocation of resources 
in favour of the poor taking place through public spending on education (Seekings, 2004: 
301; Van der Berg, 2006a). 
 
Quality differentials are a prominent problem within the South African school system. 
Given the central role of teachers in the quality of education provided and the fact that 
teacher performance is largely driven by financial incentives, it seems logical to examine 
whether teacher pay is adequate in the South Africa school education system. Indeed 
teachers are at the heart of efforts to achieve a higher quality of schooling. This is the   7 
case for a number of reasons, the first of which is the fact that teachers’ salaries are the 
largest part of public spending of education. A shift in resources in favour of the poor in 
terms of education is effectively a shift of teachers to schools that poorer children attend. 
Secondly, teacher quality is very unevenly distributed, with some teachers proving to be 
outstanding and performing beyond the expectations of both the education system and 
the community at large, whilst others fail to prepare for class, do not comply with rules, 
or  are  generally  incompetent.  Thirdly,  teachers  and  teacher  unions  encompass  a 
“powerful vested interest willing and able to delay if not thwart policy reforms”. Teachers 
are  therefore  a  powerful  political  force  in  post-apartheid  South  Africa  since  they 
represent  about  3%  of  employed  adults  in  South  Africa  and  as  such  form  a  potent 
political, cultural and economic group (Seekings, 2004: 303). 
 
3.2 South African Teachers: an Overall Picture 
3.2.1 Demographic Characteristics 
The  teaching  force  (like  many  other  professions)  has  become  considerably  more 
feminine than it was in years past and was roughly 25 percentage points more feminine 
than the rest of the labour force in 1999 (Crouch, 2001: 5). This gap has continued to 
grow, and was almost 30 percent in the September 2006 Labour Force Survey (LFS). 
South  African  teachers  also  appear  to  be  considerably  more  educated  than  other 
employed workers, with teachers having some 56% more years of education that other 
workers in 1999 (Crouch, 2001: 5). This gap had narrowed to 44% by 2006, mainly due 
to the increase in education amongst non-teachers. Teachers are also more unionized 
than  the  rest  of  the  labour  force  and  experienced  more  rapid  increases  in  their 
unionization rates than the rest of the economy until 1999, after which it stabilized. The 
South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) is one of the biggest unions within 
the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). SADTU explicitly supports the 
ANC  in  elections  and  specifically  supports  the  ANC’s  pursuit  of  SADTU  objectives 
(Seekings, 2004: 303). 
 
Age is a further dimension along which teachers differ from the remainder of the South 
African workforce: while the average age of the workforce is decreasing, the average 
age of teachers in South Africa is increasing. Finally, in the early part of the transition 
amongst the white population participation in the teaching force increased relative to 
their  participation  in  the  rest  of  the  workforce,  while  amongst  the  black  population,   8 
participation in the teaching force has decreased while it has increased in the rest of the 
workforce (Crouch, 2001: 5-6). This probably reflects new opportunities opening up for 
black teachers that were often not the case under apartheid.  
 
In terms of income, Crouch (2001: 5) finds that during the late 1990’s, teachers reported 
earning substantially higher salaries than other employed workers in the South African 
labour  force  (on  average),  in  some  cases  up  to  64%  more  than  non-teachers  (not 
accounting for the differences in hours worked between teachers and non-teachers). 
Further, the average  nominal salaries of teachers increased faster  over  the first five 
years of democracy than they have for the rest of the workforce (Crouch, 2001: 5). As 
mentioned earlier, any comparison between the wages of teachers and those of non-
teachers must take account of the fact that teachers’ working hours differ substantially 
from those of non-teachers. In South Africa teachers report working substantially fewer 
hours than non-teachers do (in some cases up to 17% less). Given this difference in 
work hours between teachers and non-teachers, the hourly wages of teachers are even 
higher. In addition, teacher salaries grew faster than did the salaries of workers in the 
rest of the workforce (Crouch, 2001: 5-6).  
 
3.2.2 Income Distribution of Teachers and Non-Teachers 
A substantial part of the higher earnings of teachers can be explained in terms of their 
higher educational attainment relative to non-teachers in the labour market. However, 
there is was still evidence that teachers shifted away from the bulk of the population with 
respect to earnings during the late 1990’s. In 1995, 80.1% of the employed population 
earned less than the top 50% of teachers; by 1999, this had increased slightly to 84.3% 
of  the  employed  population  (Crouch,  2001:  13-14).  Three  quarters  of  South  African 
teachers are in the top decile of earners, while the rest are in the second highest decile 
of  earners  and  the  mean  earnings  of  teachers  are  roughly  three  times  the  mean 
earnings  of  all  employed  workers  (Seekings,  2004:  304).  It  is  therefore  clear  that 
teachers fell increasingly into the economic elite amongst employed individuals in South 
Africa. Indeed, if the unemployed were added to the picture, teachers rose to the very 
top of the income distribution (Crouch, 2001: 14). 
 
On an international level, a general pattern of teacher relative wages is that teachers are 
initially  a  relatively  privileged  class  within  society.  As  the  economy  of the  country  in   9 
question develops, the gap between teachers and the parents of the children they teach 
becomes smaller as teachers evolve towards the same income and social classes of 
parents.  However,  in  South  Africa  this  had  not  happened  by  1999.  In  South  Africa 
teachers  have  remained  further  from  the  income  base  of  parents  than  the  level  of 
development  in  the  country  would  predict.  In  this  sense  South  Africa  seemed  to  be 
developing differently to the general international pattern, given the divergence between 
the earnings of teachers and the parents of the children they teach (Crouch, 2001: 15). 
Seekings  (2004:  303)  describes  teachers  as  a  “relatively  well-educated  and  affluent 
group within South African society” who are influential within both civil society and the 
ANC. The majority of South African teachers are indeed better off than all but roughly 
10%-15% of the parents of the teachers in their classes so it is impossible to think of 
teachers as belonging to the same socio-economic class as the children they teach. 
Further it appeared that this gap was widening over the first five years of democracy 
(Crouch, 2001: 15).  
 
3.2.3 Income Dynamics 
Government policy aimed at eroding the differentials in teacher salaries has resulted in 
different experiences (along gender and racial lines) of salary changes (Hosking, 2000: 
653).  Indeed  this  government  policy  was  aimed  at  bringing  the  salary  scales  of  all 
teachers in line with that of white male teachers. Racial disparities in salary scales were 
eliminated  in  1986  (excluding  some  of  the  homelands),  while  gender  differences  in 
salary scales were eliminated by 1992. Black female teachers therefore experienced the 
largest  salary  improvement  while  white  males  experienced  the  smallest  salary 
improvement (Hosking, 2000: 653). Importantly, government policy aimed to eliminate 
the differentials that existed in salary scale disparities rather than those which existed in 
average  wages,  so  disparities  still  exist  in  average  wages  across  gender  and  race 
groups within the teaching profession. For example, in 1992 (by which time both racial 
and gender disparities in salary scales had been eliminated) the average wage of black 
female teachers was approximately half of what it was for white male teachers (Hosking, 
2000: 653). 
 
3.2.4 Policy of Pay Compression 
A  significant  factor  affecting  teacher  salaries  is  the  role  played  by  trade  unions  in 
compressing  teacher  salaries.  After  the  political  transition,  trade  unions  called  for   10 
curtailment of teacher salaries at the upper end of the salary scale in favour of greater 
increases at the bottom end of the salary scale (Bot, 1996: 10). The Education Labour 
Relations Council suggested a 5% wage increase for teachers employed in the highest 
post levels and wages increases of up to 29% for teachers employed in the lowest post 
levels in 1997 (Bot, 1996: 10). Salary increases proposed by SADTU in 1998 were to 
increase the salaries of teachers at the lower end of the scales whilst the salaries of 
teachers at the upper end of the scale were not to increase at all (Hosking, 2000: 653). 
The motivation for this policy of pay compression was to reduce the extent to which 
increases in remuneration were achievable through additional qualifications. The policy 
therefore opposed the heavy weight that the salary structure placed on qualifications, as 
it  was  generally  believed  that  this  kind  of  emphasis  resulted  ultimately  in  an 
uncontrollable “paper chase” (Edupol, 1993: 26). 
 
Gustafsson  and  Patel  (2006:  71)  refer  to  “the  suspension  of  qualification-  and 
experience-based increments in 1995, following pressure from the major teacher union”, 
but  also  note  that  “the  salary  structure  adopted  after  1995  continued  to  be  based 
strongly on the 1995 baseline qualifications and years of experience of each teacher, 
even if increments linked to further progress were not possible”. This still affects patterns 
of remuneration today and partly account for the 12 percent higher wages paid to white 
teachers even after conditioning for education level, post sand province that were found 
for 2000 by Van der Berg (2006b: 52, 54) 
 
Despite  the  suspension  of  qualification-  and  experience-based  increments  in  1995, 
following pressure from the major teacher union, the 2005 differentials across national 
quintiles in terms of teacher pay are a function of differences in the qualifications and, to 
a lesser extent, the years of experience of teachers. This is because the salary structure 
adopted after 1995 continued to be based strongly on the 1995 baseline qualifications 
and years of experience of each teacher, even if increments linked to further progress 
were  not  possible.  This  arrangement  was  in  many  senses  a  logical  outcome  of  the 
labour relations environment of the time, which was characterised by divisions in the 
union movement largely based on the status that groups of teachers had occupied within 
the  apartheid  system.  The  biggest  teacher  union,  the  South  African  Democratic 
Teachers Union (SADTU), supported the suspension of qualifications and experience 
increments, and a stronger focus on general pay increases offering greater proportional 
increments to teachers at  the lowest  salary  levels. Given  that SADTU's membership   11 
comprised the teachers with the lowest salaries on average, due to their on-average 
lower qualifications (in terms of years of training) and fewer accumulated years in the 
system, this was arguably a rational  way for SADTU to maximise the benefits of its 
members, and minimise the benefits of historically advantaged teachers represented by 
other unions. The fact that SADTU was a major supporter of the new ANC government 
and also was a key to the maintenance of stability in the schooling system, made the 
ANC well-disposed towards accepting SADTU's position on salaries. It is important to 
recognise that these labour relations dynamics were at the heart of this first wave of 
spending  equalisation  across  the  post-apartheid  schooling  system.  Though  bringing 
quality schooling to the historically disadvantaged was implied, this was not the chief 
driving factor. 
 
 3.2.5 Demographic Dynamics 
Crouch (2001: 26-27) reports that high rates of individuals joining the teaching force are 
found amongst younger, less educated individuals, since the relative advantage for this 
group  is  the  greatest  of  all  teachers.  Indeed  the  fact  that  the  salary  increases 
experienced  by  this  group  of  teachers  are  considerably  higher  than  that  of  highly 
qualified teachers emphasises the degree of advantage that these teachers have over 
non-teachers in the South African workforce. He argues that this explains the higher 
joining rate  amongst young less-educated individuals. However, young teachers also 
have a significantly high leaving rate from the teaching force. But young teachers who 
leave the teaching force are generally better educated. This trend may also be explained 
in terms of the large increases received by teachers at the lower end of the salary scale 
relative to those at the upper end. The fact that wage increases experienced by teachers 
with  the  highest  qualifications  were  considerably  lower  than  those  of  less  qualified 
teachers implied that highly educated teachers faced poor lifetime earnings prospects in 
the teaching profession, since their pay advantage relative to non-teachers was likely to 
decline over time (Crouch, 2001: 27). Perhaps for this reason, younger teachers with 
higher levels of qualifications had a high leaving rate from the teaching force. 
 
3.2.6 Perceptions of Teachers 
There  are  strong  feelings  among  South  African  teachers  that  their  remuneration  is 
substantially  lower  than  what  is  available  in  non-teachers  professions  and  that  the 
current salary structure provides very little incentive to perform as a teacher (Hosking,   12 
2000:654). A decade ago, Arnott and Chabane (1995: 31) reported that attrition rates 
(i.e. individuals leaving the teaching profession as a percentage of the total number of 
teachers) were highest amongst whites (10.3%), followed by Indians (5.7%), coloureds 
(4.8%) and blacks (3.7%). This probably reflected the options available to these teachers 
outside  of  teaching.  Hosking  (2000:  654)  explained  that  the  main  reasons  given  for 
teachers voluntarily leaving the school system include first of all the idea that better 
career  opportunities exist elsewhere.  Secondly, they feared that “right-sizing” actions 
would result in deployment to outlying areas which were not very attractive areas of 
employment. Thirdly, they cited the lack of responsiveness of the current salary structure 
to  performance  as  a  major  obstacle  in  the  way  of  credible  teacher  incentives  for 
performance.  Finally,  teaching  provides  teachers  with  insufficient  time  to  become 
specialists in the field in which they teach.  
 
It is therefore clear that the pay received by teachers is an area of great contention and 
one which plays a significant role in who joins the teaching force, who is prepared to 
remain in the teaching force, and how those in the teaching force perform as teachers. 
The original version of this paper was written before that by Gustafsson & Patel (2009), 
who approached this issue in similar fashion, but with the emphases more specifically on 
the wage negotiation process that was in full swing at the time of their writing.   
 
4. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Data 
In attempting to answer the question “Are teachers well paid in South Africa”, the first 
issue one is confronted with is who to include in the sample of teachers. Using detailed 
occupation of employment codes from the OHS and LFS datasets, we can identify all 
individuals  who  were  classified  as  working  in  the  “primary  education  teaching 
professionals”,  “primary  education  teaching  associate  professionals”
2  and  “secondary 
education  teaching  professionals”  occupations.  By  only  including  individuals  in  these 
categories in our sample of teachers, we choose to omit those who teach at a post-
secondary  or  pre-primary  level,  as  well  as  special  education  teachers,  education 
methods specialists, school inspectors, principals and all other occupations classified 
                                                 
2 According to the ISCO definitions applied by the ILO, primary education associates professionals perform very similar 
tasks as primary education professionals, but differ from these workers “depending on the specific tasks and degree of 
responsibility in executing them, as well as on the national educational and training requirements”. It therefore seems 
natural to also include these workers in our sample of teachers.    13 
under  the  “other  teaching  professionals”  category.  The  1995  OHS  used  a  slightly 
different  classification  as  the  other  surveys,  so  that  it  is  not  possible  to  distinguish 
between  primary  and  pre-primary  teaching  professionals.  In  subsequent  surveys  we 
observe that the ratio of primary to pre-primary teaching professionals is about 23 to 1, 
so this is unlikely to lead to large inaccuracies. We also use the detailed industry of 
employment codes to exclude all teachers working outside of the “education services” 
industry. This amounts to dropping fewer than 2% of teachers. Lastly, we also observe 
some workers who claim to be working as teachers at primary or secondary level, but 
who  have  only  ever  attained  very  low  levels  of  education  themselves.  Since  these 
individuals are far from typical, and may even represent coding errors, we omit all those 
teachers  who  have  less  than  10  years  of  educational  attainment.  This  amounts  to 
dropping less than 0.4% of the teacher sample. Of the remaining teachers 6% have less 
than completed secondary education, 7% have completed secondary education only, 
51%  have  post-secondary  qualifications  but  not  university  degrees,  and  36%  have 
university degrees.  







OHS1995  1,097  3.5% 
OHS1996  316  2.2% 
OHS1997  678  2.5% 
OHS1998  594  3.4% 
OHS1999  637  2.5% 
LFS2000a  277  2.6% 
LFS2000b  789  2.8% 
LFS2001a  746  2.5% 
LFS2001b  874  3.4% 
LFS2002a  924  3.3% 
LFS2002b  859  3.4% 
LFS2003a  896  3.6% 
LFS2003b  770  3.1% 
LFS2004a  799  3.3% 
LFS2004b  818  3.3% 
LFS2005a  841  3.2% 
LFS2005b  863  3.3% 
LFS2006a  850  3.2% 
LFS2006b  840  3.2% 
TOTAL  13,628  3.1% 
   14 
In some cases it will be useful to compare the teachers to other public sector workers. 
Unfortunately, unlike the more recent Labour Force Surveys, the October Household 
Surveys  did  not  include  a  question  that  allows  us  to  identify  public  sector  workers 
directly, but a fairly accurate proxy can be created using the detailed occupation and 
industry information. 
 
In order to determine whether South African teachers are well-paid or not, we need to 
compare them to a group of workers who are as similar as possible to the teachers 
themselves. For this comparison to be valid, this counterfactual group of workers cannot 
be systematically different from the teachers in any other aspect than their choice of 
occupation. The simplest way of doing this is to merely compare the average teacher 
salary  to  that  of  subsamples  of  other  South  African  workers.  Burger  and  Yu  (2006) 
showed that inconsistencies in questionnaire design meant that sensible comparisons of 
earnings across surveys could only be made after excluding informal sector workers 
(about 30% of the total employed sampled since 2000), the self-employed (an additional 
7%) and those earning more than R200 000 per month in 2000 prices (fewer than 0.1%).  
 
4.2 Unconditional wage differential 
Figure  1  below  compares  the  monthly  earnings  of  teachers  in  the  different  years 
between 1995 and 2006 to that of other public sector employees and private  sector 
workers. Over the period as a whole, the average teacher earned slightly more (about 
20%) than their counterparts elsewhere in the public sector, and much more than those 
in the private sector (about 60%). Teachers’ average monthly earnings increased by 
0.8% per year over the period as a whole, whereas the earnings of other public sector 
workers rose by 2.1% per year, which led to a narrowing of the gap between the two 
groups. The earnings gap is partly explained by the difference in education between 
these groups: teachers on average have completed 13.7 years of education, compared 
to  9.9  years  of  education  in  the  private  sector  and  11.1  years  in  the  public  sector. 
Comparing  the  much  better  educated  teachers  with  the  rest  of  the  employed  may 
therefore be less useful than a comparison with public and private sector workers with 
comparable levels of educational attainment. Figure 1 also shows the earnings for public 
and private sector workers with at least a grade 10 education. It can now be observed 
that teachers do only slightly better than private sector workers with at least a grade 10 
education while earning about the same as other public sector workers with comparable   15 
levels of educational attainment. It should be noted that most teachers have some form 
of post-secondary qualifications, whereas the bulk of private and public sector workers 
do not (even after excluding all those with less than grade 10). In the South African 
labour market qualifications beyond completed secondary school earn a large premium, 
so that including the large group of workers with at least ten years of education but no 
more than completed secondary school in the reference groups in Figure 1 may make 
teacher earnings seem large in comparison. 
 
Figure 1: Comparison of public and private sector monthly earnings (2000 prices), 
by year 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2006 LFS 
datasets. Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
Teachers generally work fewer hours per week than other workers. This trend can also 
be observed in South Africa, where teachers work 37 hours compared to 43 and 45 
respectively  for  public  sector  and  private  sector  workers  with  at  least  a  grade  10 
education. Therefore, we would expect average teacher earnings to be lower than that of 
other  workers,  even  if they  earned  a  similar  hourly  wage  rate.  Figure  2  repeats the 
comparison from Figure 1, but this time by comparing the hourly wage rates, rather than 
the  monthly  earnings,  of  teachers,  other  public  sector  workers  and  private  sector 
employees. Not surprisingly, teachers can be observed to do even better in terms of 
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earn  more  on  an  hourly  basis  than  workers  in  the  public  or  private  sector  with 
comparable levels of education.  
 
Figure 2: Comparison of public and private sector hourly wage rates (2000 prices), 
by year 
 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2006 LFS 
datasets. Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
4.3 Conditional wage differential 
The  preceding  section  highlighted  the  importance  of  controlling  for  differences  in 
education and hours worked in comparing teachers to non-teachers. Table 2 displays 
the means of different variables often associated with wage differences in South Africa, 
for different subgroups of the workforce. It can be observed that teachers are generally 
older than other workers, have worked for their current employers for much longer, and 
are more likely to be part of a trade union. All of these characteristics should put the 
average teacher in a favourable position in terms of earnings potential, compared to the 
average non-teaching worker. On the other hand, teachers also contain a larger share of 
women  and  blacks  when  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  workforce,  and  because  their 
distribution needs to follow that of the population as a whole to serve all communities, 
they are more likely to live in rural areas or provinces that are usually associated with 
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Table 2: Means of selected variables for different samples of workers, September 
2006 
  
Teachers  Private sector  Public sector  Teachers  Private sector 
Public 
sector 
Means  Standard deviation 
Years of education  13.82  11.53  12.64  1.61  1.27  1.60 
Age  41.80  31.07  37.82  8.70  11.28  9.46 
Years of tenure  12.42  5.01  9.05  9.70  6.50  8.33 
Female  0.71  0.51  0.47  0.45  0.50  0.50 
Black  0.69  0.70  0.66  0.46  0.46  0.47 
Coloured  0.10  0.08  0.12  0.31  0.28  0.33 
Indian  0.02  0.04  0.02  0.14  0.20  0.15 
White  0.19  0.17  0.19  0.39  0.38  0.39 
Rural*  0.32  0.25  0.15  0.47  0.43  0.36 
Western Cape  0.09  0.12  0.14  0.29  0.33  0.35 
Eastern Cape  0.17  0.09  0.14  0.38  0.29  0.35 
Northern Cape  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.13  0.13  0.18 
Free State  0.06  0.06  0.09  0.24  0.24  0.28 
Kwazulu-Natal  0.21  0.20  0.19  0.41  0.40  0.39 
Northwest  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.28  0.25  0.24 
Gauteng  0.18  0.29  0.21  0.38  0.45  0.41 
Mpumalanga  0.07  0.07  0.06  0.25  0.25  0.24 
Limpopo  0.12  0.09  0.08  0.33  0.28  0.27 
Union  0.76  0.20  0.63  0.42  0.40  0.48 
Household head  0.48  0.33  0.59  0.50  0.47  0.49 
Married  0.70  0.37  0.60  0.46  0.48  0.49 
Household size  4.12  4.64  3.96  2.03  2.70  2.26 
Average hours 
worked per week  37.08  45.34  42.07  7.65  14.36  11.51 
* Due to difference in sampling design, the rural variable was not available in the March or September 2006 LFS's. The 
values in this table are from the September 2005 dataset. 
  
Moving  beyond  simple  descriptive  statistics,  we  now  control  for  the  full  range  of 
characteristics in order to determine whether teachers would be paid more or less if they 
chose not to become teachers. The simplest manner in which to do this is to include a 
teacher dummy variable in an earnings regression, but as we will show this method can 
also lead to very different results, depending on how we choose to represent the effect 
of education on earnings. Figure 3 plots the average wage rate for public and private 
sector workers with different levels of educational attainment. Public sector workers earn 
a premium up to attaining 12 years of education, after which point workers actually do 
better in the private sector.    18 
Figure 3: Comparison of public and private sector hourly wage rate (2000 prices): 
2000-2006 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from LFS1-LFS13 datasets. Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than 
R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
Figure 4 shows that most of the public sector penalty associated with post-secondary 
education  is  ascribable  to  the  low  wages  earned  by  teachers.  Whereas  additional 
education is associated with rapidly increasing wages outside of teaching, teachers with 
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Figure 4: Comparison of teacher, other public sector and private sector monthly 
earnings (2000 prices): 2000-2006 
 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from LFS1-LFS13 datasets. Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than 
R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
Table 2 reports the result of an OLS regression on the log of real monthly earnings 
(deflated using the South African Reserve Bank’s CPI series). The coefficients for  a 
regression on the sample as a whole are replicated in the first column, and show that 
after  controlling  for  differences  in  potential  experience,  population  group,  gender, 
geography and education (as well as year dummies), teachers are found to earn 21% 
more on average than public sector workers, who in turn earn 48% more than private 
sector workers. Although race and gender still have a pervasive effect on South African 
labour markets, reducing the explanatory variables to education and experience alone 
still yields an R
2 of 0.38 (as opposed to 0.48). When the sample is restricted to those 
workers with at least a grade 10 education (regression 2), the teacher premium becomes 
more or less negligible (2%), although most teachers would still benefit from the 38% 
public  sector  premium.  Including  education  quadratically  (regression  3)  makes  little 
difference to this result, but including education as a set of dummy variables reduces the 
public sector premium to 34% and actually turns the teacher premium negative. Allowing 
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Table 2: OLS regression on log of monthly earnings (2000 prices) of formal sector 
workers between 1995 and 2005 
   Regression 1  Regression 2  Regression 3  Regression 4 
Whole sample  At least grade 
10 
At least grade 
10 
At least grade 
10 
Constant  5.761  4.410  3.430  6.684 
  (0.010)  (0.020)  (0.096)  (0.012) 
Experience  0.037  0.060  0.060  0.060 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Experience squared (x 
1000) 
-0.358  -0.960  -0.963  -0.957 
(0.009)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Female  -0.317  -0.285  -0.287  -0.291 
  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Coloured  0.207  0.342  0.342  0.346 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Indian  0.413  0.425  0.424  0.433 
  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
White  0.752  0.708  0.707  0.705 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Rural  -0.298  -0.238  -0.237  -0.240 
  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Eastern Cape  -0.134  -0.060  -0.063  -0.061 
  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Northern Cape  -0.189  -0.132  -0.134  -0.129 
  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Free State  -0.177  -0.145  -0.146  -0.142 
  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009) 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.023  -0.037  -0.039  -0.032 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Northwest  0.099  0.064  0.063  0.066 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Gauteng  0.153  0.146  0.145  0.150 
  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Mpumalanga  0.051  0.006  0.003  0.007 
  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Limpopo  0.013  -0.012  -0.015  -0.024 
  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Teacher  0.187  0.018  0.020  -0.035 
  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Public sector  0.390  0.319  0.316  0.294 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Years of education  0.122  0.225  0.380    
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.015)    
Years of education squared        -0.006    
         (0.001)    
Grade 11           0.161 
           (0.007) 
Grade 12           0.383 
           (0.006) 
Diploma           0.824 
           (0.007)   21 
Bachelor's degree           1.122 
           (0.009) 
Honour's degree           1.220 
           (0.011) 
Master's degree           1.238 
           (0.032) 
Observations  260180  149890  149890  149890 
Adjusted R-squared  0.4807  0.4173  0.4177  0.4244 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and all rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS datasets. 
Regression also includes set of year dummies. Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than R200 000 per 
month and the self-employed. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.4 Oaxaca decomposition 
The  regressions  in  Table  3  restrict the  teacher-effect  to  a  shift  in  the  constant,  and 
therefore assume that there is no difference in the effects of the explanatory variables on 
earnings between teachers and non-teachers. This can be overly restrictive, and so we 
use  Oaxaca-Blinder  decompositions  to  identify  the  conditional  earnings  gap,  which 
allows all the model coefficients to differ between teachers and non-teachers. These 
decompositions are calculated using the regression coefficients from the non-teaching 
group as the reference wage structure, since it is accepted that earnings in the teaching 
profession are subject to political considerations and will therefore not be an accurate 
reflection of worker productivity. The difference in the average log of earnings for the 
teaching  and  non-teaching  groups  can  therefore  be  decomposed  in  the  following 
manner: 
    ln ln T N T N N T T N W W X X X          
where Wi represents the monthly earnings of group i,  
subscripts T and N are used to denote teachers and non-teachers, 
i X  represents the average set of personal characteristics of group i, and 
N   denotes the labour markets returns to the personal characteristics in vector  i X .  
The first term on the right-hand side of the equation represents the part of the earnings 
gap that is ascribable to the differences in the average set of personal characteristics
3 
between teachers and non-teachers, and the second term represents the differences in 
the way that the labour market rewards the same characteristics in teachers and non -
teachers. 
                                                 
3 Given the South African history of labour market discrimination against blacks and females, and the fact that we control 
for race and gender in Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions,  we refrain from ascribing the part of the earnings gap associated 
with the higher proportion of females and blacks working teachers as part of the “productivity differential”.   22 
Figure  5  below  shows  this  decomposition  of  the  log  of  monthly  earnings  differential 
between teachers and private sector workers with at least grade 10 education. We can 
observe  that  most  of  the  gap  is  initially  explained  by  differences  in  the  returns  to 
characteristics, but over time the wage gap in favour of teachers increases, mainly due 
an improvement in the average level of teacher characteristics vis-à-vis that of private 
sector  workers.  Figure  1  showed  that  between  1995  and  2005  the  average  teacher 
salary rose slightly, whereas the average private sector wage (for those with grade 10 or 
more) declined marginally. This decline is solely due to private sector workers with grade 
10,  grade  11  or  grade  12,  since  the  earnings  of  workers  with  post-secondary 
qualifications increased over the period. The decrease  experienced by private sector 
workers  without  some  form  of  higher  education  is  due  to  the  rapid  expansion  of 
secondary education – and therefore a rapid increase in the supply of workers with these 
qualifications – as well as the continually rising demand for highly skilled labour at the 
cost of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. The increasing wage gap observed in Figure 
5  is  therefore  not  due  to  a  further  widening  gap  in  characteristics  between  the  two 
groups,  but  rather  to  an  increase  in  the  rewards  to  the  education  gap  that  already 
existed in 1995.  
 
Figure 5: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of monthly earnings gap between 
teachers and private sector workers with at least grade 10 (2000 prices), by year 
 
 
Figure 6 repeats the analysis, but now by comparing teachers with other public sector 
employees (with at least grade 10). Most of the earnings differential between these two 
groups is now explained by the differences in the average level of characteristics, rather 
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than differences in the returns to these characteristics. This component did not change 
much over the period under consideration, although there appears to have been a slight 
trend away from teachers benefiting from the differential returns to characteristics, and 
towards the benefit of other public sector workers. 
 
Figure 6: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of monthly earnings gap between 
teachers and public sector workers with at least grade 10 (2000 prices), by year 
 
 
Table 3 reports the regression results for teachers, private sector workers and other 
public sector workers, for September 2005. It can be observed from the adjusted R
2’s 
that  earnings  in  the  private  sector  are  more  closely  correlated  to  observable 
characteristic  than  in  the  public  sector,  and  much  more  so  than  in  the  teaching 
profession. The coefficient results will now be  discussed in turn. We did not include 
tenure in the regression, due to the high degree of collinearity with experience amongst 
teachers. It was also decided to omit union membership from the model. Since teachers 
in public schools are all covered by union-negotiated wage agreements, it is not clear 
how to interpret the union coefficient in an earnings regression for teachers. 
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Table 3: OLS regression on log of monthly earnings (2000 prices) of formal sector 
workers in September 2005 
   Teachers  Private sector  Other public sector 
Constant  7.742  7.022  7.673 
  (0.180)  (0.044)  (0.096) 
Experience  0.033  0.052  0.029 
  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Experience squared (x 1000)  -0.524  -0.783  -0.339 
(0.224)  (0.084)  (0.157) 
Female  0.016  -0.329  -0.228 
  (0.044)  (0.020)  (0.033) 
Coloured  0.209  0.410  0.203 
  (0.112)  (0.035)  (0.065) 
Indian  -0.146  0.609  0.205 
  (0.142)  (0.045)  (0.091) 
White  0.164  0.758  0.314 
  (0.071)  (0.025)  (0.043) 
Rural  -0.067  -0.292  -0.157 
  (0.052)  (0.034)  (0.051) 
Eastern Cape  -0.119  -0.129  0.091 
  (0.120)  (0.043)  (0.072) 
Northern Cape  -0.173  -0.208  -0.224 
  (0.186)  (0.082)  (0.107) 
Free State  -0.029  -0.292  0.002 
  (0.135)  (0.050)  (0.076) 
Kwazulu-Natal  -0.142  -0.246  -0.128 
  (0.124)  (0.038)  (0.068) 
Northwest  -0.069  0.019  0.031 
  (0.138)  (0.052)  (0.081) 
Gauteng  -0.162  0.108  0.208 
  (0.121)  (0.033)  (0.065) 
Mpumalanga  -0.133  -0.140  -0.092 
  (0.140)  (0.051)  (0.097) 
Limpopo  -0.053  -0.134  -0.001 
  (0.129)  (0.056)  (0.086) 
Grade 10  -1.300  -0.402  -0.581 
  (0.278)  (0.029)  (0.066) 
Grade 11  0.203  -0.240  -0.298 
  (0.111)  (0.028)  (0.057) 
Diploma  0.205  0.440  0.248 
  (0.076)  (0.032)  (0.042) 
Bachelor's degree  0.401  1.026  0.743 
  (0.085)  (0.049)  (0.070) 
Honour's degree  0.529  0.955  0.858 
  (0.085)  (0.060)  (0.065) 
Master's degree  0.596  1.434  1.578 
  (0.174)  (0.105)  (0.103) 
Observations  770  6517  2059   25 
Adjusted R-squared  0.1277  0.4242  0.3376 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and all rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS datasets. 
Excludes informal sector workers, those earning more than R200 000 per month and the self-employed. Reference group: 
African male matriculants residing in the urban Western Cape. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
4.4.1 Education 
Teachers receive returns to additional years of education, but except for moving from 
grade  10 to grade  11, these  returns  are  considerably  less  than  what  is  received  by 
workers in the private and public sector. This is consistent with what was observed in 
Figure 4.  
 
4.4.2 Experience 
All three groups receive increasing but concave returns to potential experience, but this 
increase is much steeper in the private sector than in either the teaching profession or in 
the rest of the public sector. Although the regression coefficients show that the initial 
increase in earnings associated with more years of experience is (marginally) steeper in 
the education sector than in the rest of the public service, these returns also decrease at 
a  quicker  rate,  so  that  the  experience  profiles  (after  controlling  for  the  other 
characteristics)  are  very  similar  for  these  two  groups  of  workers.  Merely  plotting  the 
average earnings levels for workers of different ages (with at least grade 10) show that 
at  early ages teacher salaries are marginally higher than for public or private  sector 
workers, but that earnings rise slightly slower over the life-cycle. A more pronounced 
difference in the earnings profiles is observed when restricting our sample to only those 
with post-secondary qualifications (Figure 8). Teachers earn a salary that is very similar 
to that of private and public sector employees at an age of 22, but their earnings-age 
profile is much flatter, leading to a large earnings gap appearing at later ages. By the 
age of 30 the earnings of teachers are exceeded by that of private and public sector 
workers (with post-secondary qualifications) by 77% and 24% respectively. By the age of 
40 that differential has climbed even further, to 96% and 36%. 
   26 
Figure 8: Comparison of teacher, other public sector and private sector monthly 
earnings (2000 prices) for workers with more than completed secondary 
education: 2000-2006, by age 
 
Notes: Authors’ own calculations from all rounds of 2000 to 2006 LFS datasets. Excludes informal sector workers, those 
earning more than R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
4.4.3 Tenure 
Due  to  the  high  degree  of  collinearity  between  tenure  and  years  of  experience  for 
teachers (who can only change their employer by leaving the public school system) the 
regressions  in  table  3  were  estimated  by  including  only  experience  and  not  tenure. 
However, plotting years of tenure against the average earnings of the three groups of 
workers  indicate  that  teachers  gain  less  from  staying  at  their  current  employers  for 
longer. Again the effect is even stronger when restricting our sample to only those with 
post-secondary qualifications (Figure 9).  The returns to tenure are substantially smaller 
for  teachers  than  for  workers  elsewhere  in  the  public  sector,  and  even  lower  when 
compared to private sector employees.  
 
4.4.4 Gender and Race 
Despite almost a decade of affirmative action policies, race and gender are still highly 
correlated  to  earnings  and  unemployment  in  South  Africa.  Table  3  shows  that  the 
earnings penalty associated with being a women, or with being black, coloured or Indian 
rather than white, is considerably less in the public than in the private sector, and much 
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Figure 9: Comparison of teacher, other public sector and private sector monthly 
earnings (2000 prices): 2000-2006, by years of tenure 
 
 
4.4.5 Area of residence 
Table  3  also  shows  that  the  earnings  disparities  associated  with  differences  in 
geography  (either  rural-urban  or  provinces)  is  much  lower  amongst  teachers  than 
amongst non-teachers in either the private or the public sector. 
 
4.5 Lemieux decomposition of earnings distribution 
The Oaxaca decomposition allows an investigation into the causes of the differences in 
the average earnings between teachers and some reference group. However, it is not 
just the difference at the means of these earnings distributions that shape the incentives 
for teachers. Workers with above-average endowments of productive characteristics will 
be  more  interested  in  how  the  earnings  of  teachers  at  the  top  of  their  earnings 
distribution compares to that of an alternative occupation. Lemieux (2002) developed a 
technique  that  uses  the  re-weighting  of  observations  to  decompose  the  earnings 
distribution  into  “characteristics”  and  “remuneration”  components.  Essentially,  we  re-
weight  the  non-teachers  so  that  they  resemble  teachers  in  terms  of  their  personal 
characteristics.  The  resulting  earnings  distribution  will  therefore  represent  what  the 
earnings of non-teachers would look like if they had the same characteristics of teachers 
or,  equivalently,  what  teachers’  earnings  distribution  would  be  if  they  were  paid 
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Figure 10 compares the earnings distribution of teachers (on a log scale) with that of 
private sector workers with more than a grade 10 education. Except for the fact that 
most  of  the  teachers  clearly  earn  more  than  private  sector  workers,  private  sector 
earnings  are  much  more  widely  dispersed.  The  simulated  earnings  distribution  of 
teachers paid according to the private sector wage structure is also shown. Interestingly, 
this distribution is not as narrowly distributed as teachers’ earnings, which implies that 
most  of  the  lack  of  variation  in  teacher  salaries  is  due  to  wage  compression  in  the 
education sector, rather than to the homogeneity of teachers.  
 
Figure 10: Decomposition of teacher and private sector monthly earnings 
distributions (2000 prices): 1995-2005 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS 
datasets.  Excludes  workers  with  less  than  grade  10  education,  informal  sector  workers,  those  earning  more  than  
R200 000 per month and the self-employed. 
 
Table 4 compares the (approximated) actual teacher earnings at different points of the 
distribution  to  that  of the  earnings  distribution for  teachers  paid  as  non-teachers,  as 
shown in Figure 10 above. At the bottom of the earnings distribution teachers enjoy a 
large wage premium compared to what they would have earned in the private sector. 
This premium shrinks as one moves up the wage distribution and turns into a penalty at 
the 75
th percentile. This suggests that – as long as the differences in wage structures do 
not merely reflect differences in unobserved heterogeneity – the incentives are such as 
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profession, where they will earn more than in the private sector, while pushing those with 
a more favourable set of characteristics into the private sector.   
 
Table 4: Actual and simulated teacher earnings at different percentiles: 1995-2005 
Percentile  Actual teacher earnings 
Teacher earnings on non-
teacher earnings structure  Teaching premium 
5
th  1 087  302  259% 
10
th  1 523  462  230% 
25
th  2 225  1 042  114% 
50
th  3 191  2 228  43% 
75
th  4 184  4 202  0% 
90
th  5 159  7 428  -31% 
95
th  5 770  10 339  -44% 
Note: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS 
datasets. 
 
Comparing teachers to non-teachers elsewhere in the public sector (Figure 11) shows 
that the distribution of public sector wage earnings resemble that of teachers much more 
closely  than  did  the  private  sector.  Using  the  Lemieux-technique  to  generate  the 
earnings distribution for teachers paid as non-teaching public sector workers, it can be 
observed that this distribution lies slightly to the right of non-teacher earners (teachers 
have a more favourable distribution of personal characteristics) and is not as narrowly 
distributed  as  that  of  teachers  (wage  compression  exists  in  the  teaching  profession, 
even compared to the rest of the public sector).  
 
Table 5 reports the wage premia for teachers relative to what they would have earned in 
the rest of the public sector. Similarly to what was found when comparing teachers to the 
private sector, teachers at the bottom end of the distribution can be seen to benefit from 
the wage compression, whereas those at the top are penalised relative to their public 
sector counterparts. The incentive structure is therefore the same as before: the best 
teachers will find it attractive to leave the profession for other public sector employment, 
whereas the least productive public sector workers may be drawn into teaching.    30 
Figure 11: Decomposition of teacher and other public sector monthly earnings 
distributions (2000 prices): 1995-2005 
 
Note: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS 
datasets.  Excludes  workers  with  less  than  grade  10  education,  informal  sector  workers,  those  earning  more  than  
R200 000 per month and the self-employed 
 




Teacher earnings on non-
teacher earnings structure  Teaching premium 
5
th  1087  677  61% 
10
th  1523  1132  35% 
25
th  2225  1906  17% 
50
th  3191  2965  8% 
75
th  4184  4376  -4% 
90
th  5159  6375  -19% 
95
th  5770  8417  -31% 
Note: Authors’ own calculations from OHS’s between 1995 and 1999, and September rounds of 2000 to 2005 LFS 
datasets. 
 
5. THE DECISION TO BECOME TEACHERS 
The preceding section analysed the manner in which the wage structure could shape the 
incentives to join or leave the teaching profession. This section will attempt to look at the 
movement of groups of individuals born in the same year, in order to gauge whether 
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Figure 10 shows the share of all employed workers who are working as teachers, for the 
group of individuals who were born in the same year, at different points in their lives. 
Moving  averages  were  used  to  smooth  the  data,  both  over  time  and  across  birth 
cohorts.
4 Except for the inverse u-shaped employment rate that is observed over the life-
cycle, we now also observe that within the group  of employed workers, the share of 
teachers is initially low (maybe as people are finishing their education),  increases up to 
an age of 40  and then starts to decline.  Interestingly, the decline in  the proportion of 
workers employed as teachers after the age of 40 does not appear to be due to people 
leaving the teaching profession, but rather due to the fact that a smaller share of workers 
in these cohorts had taken up teaching as a profession in the first place.  
 
Figure 10: Share of employees working as teachers, by year and age 
 
 
Figure 11 below graphs the unemployment rates experienced by  workers with some 
level of post-secondary qualification, by their field of study. When comparing the total 
population, we observe that the unemployment rate for people with qualifications in the 
                                                 
4 A point in figure 10 that represents a group of age 20 in year 2000 was therefore the (unweighted) average of the birth 
cohorts who were aged 19, 20  and 21, followed in years 1999, 2000 and 2001. This restricts large jumps between 
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field of “education, training and development”, is more or less at the average of what is 
observed for other fields of study. If we exclude either men or whites from the sample, 
we can observe that the probability of finding work with a qualification in the field of 
education  actually  exceeds  that  associated  with  most  other  fields  of  study.  If  this  is 
combined with the lenient entry requirements for a teaching degree or diploma relative to 
some of the other low-unemployment fields of study such as medicine, then it is possible 
that  individuals  choose  to  accept  the  lower  earnings  associated  with  the  teaching 
profession in exchange for the higher probably of finding paid formal sector employment. 
Given the high unemployment rates that have been observed in South African over the 
past  few  years,  this  may  provide  a  strong  incentive  towards  entering  the  teaching 
profession. 
 
Figure 11: Unemployment rate experienced by workers with tertiary qualifications 
(2000-2004), by field of study 
 
 



















Whole population Excluding whites Excluding men  33 
6. Conclusion 
This  report  analysed  the  earnings  of  teachers  in  South  Africa  in  order  to  determine 
whether  these  workers  are  adequately  compensated  or  not.  Although  the  average 
teacher  earns  substantially  more  than  the  average  worker  elsewhere  in  the  labour 
market, this is largely due to the higher levels of education that they possess.  Oaxaca 
decompositions show that  the average teacher earns more than the average private 
sector  worker  mainly  due  to  the  more  favourable  levels  of  personal  characteristics, 
whereas the wage premium they earn relative to other public sector workers  can be 
ascribed  to  differences  in  the  wage  structures.  Regression  analysis  showed  that 
teachers receive much smaller returns to additional years of education, experience or 
tenure, which may serve as a disincentive to invest further in human capital, or to stay in 
the  teaching  profession.  Lemieux-decompositions  revealed  that,  relative  to  both  the 
public  and  private  sectors,  teachers  at  the  top  end  of  the  earnings  distribution  are 
underpaid,  whereas  teachers  at  the  bottom  end  are  overpaid.  This  compression  of 
wages  could  mean  that  teachers  with  the  most  favourable  sets  of  labour  market 
characteristics will leave the teaching profession, whereas those with least favourable 
endowments  will  find  it  attractive  to  stay.  A  brief  cohort-panel  analysis  appears  to 
indicate that the share of all workers employed in the teaching profession takes on an 
inverse u-shape, not because teachers tend to leave the education system at certain 
ages, but rather due to  the  lower  share of workers,  amongst  older generations, that 
entered  teaching  in the first  place.  A  possible  explanation  for  the  lack  of  a  stronger 
response to these incentives could be that, amidst very high and rising unemployment 
rates, acquiring a qualification as a teacher was associated with a fairly high probability 
of finding work in South Africa.  
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